Added some recent information about SunEC and Utimaco HSM problems.

Importing https://github.com/google/wycheproof/pull/50.

PiperOrigin-RevId: 195427107
GitOrigin-RevId: 39bbc63b20d5d08c5457bd338c90f45370047831

java/com/google/security/wycheproof/TestUtil.java

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ public class TestUtil {
     Provider provider = (Provider) Class.forName(className).getConstructor().newInstance();
     Security.insertProviderAt(provider, 1);
   }
-  
+
   public static void printJavaInformation() {
     System.out.println("Running with: ");
     System.out.println("  java.runtime.name: " + System.getProperty("java.runtime.name"));

java/com/google/security/wycheproof/testcases/EcdhTest.java

@@ -57,10 +57,6 @@ import org.junit.runners.JUnit4;
  * <p>Adrian Antipa, Daniel Brown, Alfred Menezes, Rene Struik, and Scott Vanstone, "Validation of
  * Elliptic Curve Public Keys", PKC 2003, https://www.iacr.org/archive/pkc2003/25670211/25670211.pdf
  *
- * <p>Tibor Jager, Jörg Schwenk, Juraj Somorovsky, "Practical Invalid Curve Attacks on TLS-ECDH", 
- * ESORICS'15, https://www.nds.rub.de/research/publications/ESORICS15/ 
- * (describes attacks on BouncyCastle and SunEC)
- *
  * <p><b>Bugs:</b> CVE-2015-7940: BouncyCastle before 1.51 does not validate a point is on the
  * curve. BouncyCastle v.1.52 checks that the public key point is on the public key curve but does
  * not check whether public key and private key use the same curve. BouncyCastle v.1.53 is still
@@ -68,7 +64,7 @@ import org.junit.runners.JUnit4;
  * used by the public key. ECDHC would then reduce the private key modulo this order, which can be
  * used to find the private key.
  *
- * <p>CVE-2015-6924: Utimaco HSMs vulnerable to invalid curve attacks, which made the private key 
+ * <p>CVE-2015-6924: Utimaco HSMs vulnerable to invalid curve attacks, which made the private key
  * extraction possible.
  *
  * <p>CVE-2015-7940: Issue with elliptic curve addition in mixed Jacobian-affine coordinates