salt length do not match. Applications typically used RSA-PSS such
that signature hash and mgf hash are the same and the salt length
is either 0 or the size of the hash.
RFC 8017 allows other combinations. These test check that such
combinations are either rejected or are implemented correctly.
The test file contains just one valid signature for each combination
of mgf-hash signature-hash, salt length that is tested.
Results:
BoringSSL accepts all signatures.
BouncyCastle rejects signatures where mgf and signature hash do not match.
Conscrypt rejects signatures where mgf and signature hash do not match.
Jdk (i.e. the version we have in google3) does not implement RSA-PSS yet.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 206761543
GitOrigin-RevId: f5cffdf23fc04cc0b15925c34c0cb74dfda51737
Please note that this was created with g4 rollback, but the version number in the Wycheproof file regresses. I'm unsure whether that's desired. The BoringSSL change works for both the old and new files so can be landed without touching Wycheproof if that's better.
*** Reason for rollback ***
Fix to BoringSSL scripts now included.
*** Original change description ***
Adding the curve back to the test cases to avoid failing BoringSSL tests.
***
PiperOrigin-RevId: 205957468
GitOrigin-RevId: c0afaa191d5509050bbea307265b07bca61b4714
Tests using the new test vectors will be added in another CL.
Changes:
AES-GCM has test vectors for modified tags, which were previously missing.
ECDSA has more test vectors for potential arithmetic errors.
There are no more random test vectors.
Webcrypto has a few test vectors with the bitcoin curve (since some libraries
want to add this).
DSA and ECDSA have more invalid test vectors with r,s = ((q-1)/2 or q-1).
This is motivated by some weak ElGamal implementation in beecrypt.
ECDH test vectors have some new files where the public key is just a point
using SEC 1 / X9.62 format.
All tests for ASN modifications are removed from ecdh_test.json, so that
this file has a more resonable size. These test vectors are included in
the files ecdh_curve_test.json.
EDDSA has a few more invalid test vectors for malformed signatures.
(I.e. the python implementation in the RFC has a small bug).
Adding test vectors for AES-CCM. (tested against BouncyCastle, which sort of
abuses the JCE interface)
There are some test vectors for RSA-PSS (so far tested with BouncyCastle and boringSSL)
More tests will be added when we have an idea what is actually being used.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 205802874
GitOrigin-RevId: 250ab89370a0dcfc56e887fb185a494f45f9a3f5
First, background and history:
In Java, an ECDH public key can be encoded as a SubjectPublicKeyInfo spec [1]. This spec contains the public point, and a named curve or curve parameters [2]. To test ECDH libraries, Wycheproof generates public key specs with modified curve parameters, and checks that the libraries must reject them [3].
Android M and N (and possibly other versions) do not reject said public keys specs. Given a spec Android just takes the field ID, and derives the rest of the parameters. This leads to a somewhat interesting situation: not only Android accepts Wycheproof's modified public key specs, but it also computes the shared secrets correctly and securely. So we changed Wycheproof to accept Android's behavior, and added to each test case the expected shared secret, had the public key spec not been modified.
What went wrong:
The expected shared secrets for "modified prime" and "public key of order 3" test are incorrect. I found that the public key specs (the "public" field in the ecdh_test.json) don't contain the same public point as in other tests. I'm not sure this is intentional, but because the public point is different the expected shared secret must be different too.
Let's look at test case #336. Its expected shared secret is the same as test case #335. Yet two test cases contain two different public points, as shown below (
the public point is the last BIT STRING, it starts with 04):
# Test case 335
0 304: SEQUENCE {
4 233: SEQUENCE {
7 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 840 10045 2 1'
16 221: SEQUENCE {
19 1: INTEGER 1
22 44: SEQUENCE {
24 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 840 10045 1 1'
33 33: INTEGER
: 00 FF FF FF FF 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
: 00 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
: FF
: }
68 68: SEQUENCE {
70 32: OCTET STRING
: FF FF FF FF 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
: 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FC
104 32: OCTET STRING
: 5A C6 35 D8 AA 3A 93 E7 B3 EB BD 55 76 98 86 BC
: 65 1D 06 B0 CC 53 B0 F6 3B CE 3C 3E 27 D2 60 4B
: }
138 65: OCTET STRING
: 04 6B 17 D1 F2 E1 2C 42 47 F8 BC E6 E5 63 A4 40
: F2 77 03 7D 81 2D EB 33 A0 F4 A1 39 45 D8 98 C2
: 96 4F E3 42 E2 FE 1A 7F 9B 8E E7 EB 4A 7C 0F 9E
: 16 2B CE 33 57 6B 31 5E CE CB B6 40 68 37 BF 51
: F5
205 33: INTEGER
: 00 FF FF FF FF 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
: FF BC E6 FA AD A7 17 9E 84 F3 B9 CA C2 FC 63 25
: 51
: }
: }
240 66: BIT STRING
: 04 15 10 26 4C 18 9C 3D 52 3F F9 91 6A BD 70 69
: EF A6 96 8D 8D C7 DD B6 45 7D 78 69 B5 3E A6 0C
: DC FA FB 7E D4 78 6D A1 5D 29 EE 59 25 6F 53 6D
: A3 57 5A 48 88 C1 BB 0A 95 B2 56 F4 A7 E9 FD 76
: 4A
: }
# Test case 336:
0 307: SEQUENCE {
4 236: SEQUENCE {
7 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 840 10045 2 1'
16 224: SEQUENCE {
19 1: INTEGER 1
22 44: SEQUENCE {
24 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 840 10045 1 1'
33 33: INTEGER
: 00 FD 09 10 59 A6 89 36 35 F9 00 E9 44 9D 63 F5
: 72 B2 AE BC 4C FF 7B 4E 5E 33 F1 B2 00 E8 BB C1
: 45
: }
68 68: SEQUENCE {
70 32: OCTET STRING
: 02 F6 EF A5 59 76 C9 CB 06 FF 16 BB 62 9C 0A 8D
: 4D 51 43 B4 00 84 B1 A1 CC 0E 4D FF 17 44 3E B7
104 32: OCTET STRING
: 5A C6 35 D8 AA 3A 93 E7 B3 EB BD 55 76 98 86 BC
: 65 1D 06 B0 CC 53 B0 F6 3B CE 3C 3E 27 D2 60 4B
: }
138 65: OCTET STRING
: 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 59 7F A9 4B
: 1F D9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
: 02 1B 8C 7D D7 7F 9A 95 62 79 22 EC EE FE A7 3F
: 02 8F 1E C9 5B A9 B8 FA 95 A3 AD 24 BD F9 FF F4
: 14
205 33: INTEGER
: 00 FF FF FF FF 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
: FF BC E6 FA AD A7 17 9E 84 F3 B9 CA C2 FC 63 25
: 51
240 1: INTEGER 1
: }
: }
243 66: BIT STRING
: 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 59 7F A9 4B
: 1F D9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
: 02 1B 8C 7D D7 7F 9A 95 62 79 22 EC EE FE A7 3F
: 02 8F 1E C9 5B A9 B8 FA 95 A3 AD 24 BD F9 FF F4
: 14
: }
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.7.
[2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.5
[3] Many libraries don't, and usually that leads to vulnerabilities that leak the private key.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 204515375
GitOrigin-RevId: 26b6eb30145d94209b9d828db7c6a0b0ed6be695
This CL only adds test vectors.
Changes using the new test vectors are in CL 199130745.
There are the following changes to version 0.4:
ECDSA test vectors with a valid signature but non-DER encoding
have "result":"invalid" and have the flag "BER".
Version 0.4.4 has some additional test vectors:
- Tests for invalid encoding of the INTEGER 0 (i.e. "0200" instead
of "020100")
- Truncation after the ASN tag.
- ECDH test vectors now include shared secrets in invalid test vectors.
This allows to check if an implementation is just sloppy at comparing
public keys (i.e. ignoring parameters) or vulnerable (i.e. using
modified parameters for ECDH computation)
- More tests vectors like the unexplained test vector in b/74209208
- ECDH now has tests vectors where public and private keys are
on different, but isomorphic curves. The result is invalid, since
the encoding of the shared secret is undefined.
- ECDH has test vectors with modified ASN. Again the shared secret
computed with the original public key is included so that it is
a bit easier to distinguish between serious and non-serious cases.
- Some third party test cases were added to all files. They are
removed.
Version 0.4.5:
- adds more test vectors for ECDSA.
- adds more test vectors for RSA signatures and splits the signatures
into more files, sorted by key size and hash.
Version 0.4.6:
- adds an uncompressed encoding to EC keys.
- rsa_signature_test.json now contains more keys for size 1024 to 4096.
Most keys only contain a small number of tests.
More extensive tests are done with a 2048 bit key only.
New bugs:
BouncyCastle and ConsCrypt both accepts some invalid keys (with
additional garbage) as valid. These bugs are currently silenced
by marking the test vectors as acceptable. I.e. the first goal is
to verify that invalid ECDH keys cannot be used to find the private
key.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 199611433
GitOrigin-RevId: f1f99cc52617e18224ec98f84dcaa55c42df9b46
This supports RFC 3394 and RFC 5649,
which is also described in NIST SP 800 38f.
I also have a mini analysis of the primitive:
If one cares about distinguishing attacks then
there is an attack with a somewhat smaller complexity
than what NIST claims in their standard:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oH36v6SNdff5tkydC75EnqRyqqgHbXR4hy_SMPzwqVU/edit?usp=sharing
But even if one cares about these attacks then the key
wrappings are nowhere comparable to the attacks possible against e.g.
AES-GCM.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 192747615
GitOrigin-RevId: 0bebc767022ba3053c1d0391378d5c0b32b7f5be
Daniel Bleichenbacher